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ABSTRACT 
 
Aims: A Performance related pay (PRP) plan rewards employees with a financial payment, either 
consolidated or non consolidated, following an assessment of their performance and, typically, the 
achievement of objectives. Many different types of PRP schemes have been developed over the 
years. Regardless of the scheme chosen, a particularly critical factor in the design of a performance-
related pay (PRP) plan concerns the choice of parameters or indicators on which variable pay 
should be determined. The research goal of this work is to develop an analytical model that can help 
companies to identify the optimal set of these parameters. 
Methodology: The model proposed in the paper has been developed through an empirical research 
methodology involving a large sample of companies. Data were collected by means of a 
questionnaire distributed to companies which have implementing for at least ten years a 
performance-related pay (PRP) scheme for shop-floor workers. 
Results: Descriptive and interpretative analysis of empirical results have identified a set of 
relationships between some company characteristics and the use of specific indicators for 
measuring the bonus to be given to the shop floor workers. The proposed model correlates three 
different typologies of companies (i.e. make to stock, make to order and engineering to order) with 
different types of indicators (i.e. profitability, productivity, efficiency and quality) which have to be 
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used for bonus calculation. After having recognized to which category a firm belongs, it can easily 
identify the types of indicators to be used. 
Originality: The proposed model can actually help companies to identify the optimal set of 
parameters on which basing the PRP plan. A set of strong relationships have been recognized 
between some company characteristics and different types of indicators that should be employed for 
determining the variable bonus for shop-floor workers. 
 
 
Keywords: Performance appraisal; pay; incentive schemes; human resource management; 
performance measurement. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Incentive pay or performance-related pay (PRP) 
has a long standing tradition in economic 
analysis and policymaking. From the Classical 
economists [1,2] to analysts and practitioners, 
compensation systems based on employee 
performance are seen as a way to correct some 
of the imperfections in labour, product and capital 
markets that affect the employment relationship. 
 
Many different types of PRP schemes have been 
developed over the years: Individual 
Performance Awards, Team Awards, Gain-
sharing/Productivity Awards, Cash Profit Sharing 
Awards, Business Incentive Awards, Special 
Recognition Awards and so on [3]. Most of the 
literature has shown that these PRP systems do 
have a marked impact on employee and 
organization performances. The evidence is 
drawn from a variety of sources including 
descriptive reviews [4,5] meta-analyses [6], 
experimental studies [7,8], and professional 
human resource program assessments [9]. 
However, the evidence obtained in the empirical 
research is mixed and some authors point out 
that the adoption of PRP does not always mean 
advantages and benefits for firms and workers 
[10]. 
 
The literature on the PRP schemes presents 
different analysis perspectives, the most 
frequently examined items are: 
 
• factors which influence the adoption of the 
PRP plan; 
• the role of environmental variables in 
designing the PRP plan; 
• the level of measurement (individual,  
team, business unit, or the entire 
organisation); 
• how to monitor and evaluate the PRP plan; 
• the role of the unions in the success or 
failure of a PRP plan; 
• the indicators on which variable pay should 
be based. 
The last item in the preceding list plays a critical 
role in the design of a PRP plan. The problem 
that an employer faces is whether the 
parameters that are going to be used for 
quantifying performance really do reflect 
increased profits. In other words, the concept of 
sharing can really only be introduced if s/he is 
sure that extra “earnings” have been generated 
by improved performances. 
 
The research goal of this work is to develop an 
analytical model which enables to investigate the 
choices made by companies when defining the 
indicators on which base the bonus. In other 
words, we intend to develop a model of analysis 
that can help companies to identify the optimal 
set of parameters on which basing the PRP plan. 
This model should be a contingent model in the 
sense that the choice of which parameters to 
employ is inevitably affected by business context. 
 
The model has been developed through an 
empirical research methodology. A large sample 
of companies which have adopted a PRP 
scheme has been analysed. First, a descriptive 
analysis of the indicators utilized by these 
companies is carried out. Alongside the 
descriptive analysis, an interpretative analysis is 
performed in order to build the model which is 
able to support the company in identifying the 
appropriate parameters. Therefore, this study 
aims to build a reference tool for companies that 
would like to move in the direction of the 
company labour’s agreements according to the 
PRP logic. 
 
In the following section, the problem of the 
correct identification of the indicators is 
discussed in theoretical terms. 
 
2. THE INTRODUCTION OF 
PERFORMANCE-RELATED PAY: A 
REVOLUTION IN ITALIAN INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS 
 
PRP systems have existed in various forms for 
the last 50 years but in recent years academic 
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and practitioner interest in PRP has been 
increasing. Basically, the increased interest in 
new forms of payment has arisen in response to 
fundamental changes in the nature of work [11] 
[12]. In all likelihood, these changes are linked to 
the decline of mass production and the rise of 
new production models based on techniques 
such as Just-in-Time (JIT) and Total Quality 
Control (TQC) which have questioned the 
traditionally job-based payment structures. 
 
The Italian situation has for many years been 
characterised by a salary structure based on a 
series of automatisms and fixed components that 
were subject to national contracts. In the years 
immediately after the Second World War, a 
centralised system for wage bargaining was 
developed which allowed for only a very limited 
level of bargaining at the level of firms. However, 
it did leave room for some forms of worker 
incentive, basically piecework, a payment system 
based on work output rather than on the time for 
which an individual's work effort is available. 
 
This was to a certain extent modified during the 
1960s and 1970s when the role played by 
Unions at the level of the firm expanded to its 
greatest extent. But growing concern about the 
coming economic and employment crisis that 
followed the first shocks caused by rising oil 
prices and by high levels of conflict within firms 
during the second half of the 1970s, helped 
reinstate the tendency to centralise industrial 
relations. 
 
Not until the early 1990s, following actions by 
central government, did negotiations begin which 
aimed at a radical reform of salary structure and 
of the national bargaining system itself in order to 
encourage the adoption of flexible bonus and 
pay incentive schemes in Italy[13]. These 
negotiations culminated in the Protocol of 23 July 
1993 (named "Premio di Risultato" – Payment-
by-Results), which was drawn up between the 
Italian government, Union representatives and 
Employers confederations. The cultural impact of 
this Protocol on company-level bargaining was 
undoubtedly considerable. The qualifying 
principle of this Protocol is the assumption of 
company performance as the point of 
convergence of interests of the workers and the 
company. This Protocol also made it possible for 
the first time to link part of the salary to the 
results achieved by the firm, in terms of 
improvements in efficiency, quality, production 
and financial performances.  
 
The fundamental points of this Protocol are: 
 
− two levels of bargaining are provided for, at 
the national and the single firm level. 
− the Premium based on Results is a 
bonus/extra payment, that is calculated on 
the basis of how successful the firm has 
been in carrying out programmes, agreed 
between management and the employees, 
which aimed to increase those relevant 
aspects that help to improve the firm’s 
competitiveness;  
− extra payments are both reversible and 
variable, and are based on multi-factor 
incentives (productivity, efficacy, quality, 
flexibility, participation) which are very 
different form those of the previous 
decades which were irreversible, in fixed 
sums and included in the salary structure 
permanently. 
 
Various studies have highlighted the positive 
benefits this Protocol has had on the 
performance of firms and more generally on 
industrial relations in Italy [14-16]. 
 
As previously said the choice of the indicators on 
which to base and award the bonuses is a crucial 
topic when building up a PRP plan. For this 
reason, next section will deepen this issue. 
 
3. PROFIT SHARING VS GAIN SHARING 
 
In PRP scheme design, a particularly important 
aspect is the choice of the parameters or 
indicators that, treated under periodic 
measurement, are the basis for the calculation of 
the bonus to be paid out to the workers. For the 
entrepreneur, it is important that the 
improvement of the values on the chosen 
parameters is undoubtedly linked to a real 
improvement of firm profit. In fact, a PRP plan is 
a contract oriented to the so-called "profit 
sharing". An operation of "sharing" can be 
proceed if there is a guarantee that additional 
"profit", resulted from the performance 
improvement, is generated. Therefore, there is 
the need on behalf of the entrepreneur to have 
the guarantee that the chosen parameters for the 
bonus quantification have a clear correlation with 
the generation of an additional profit. 
 
Traditionally, the parameters utilized for the 
construction of a PRP scheme can be grouped 
into the following classes [17-20]: 
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a) profitability parameters 
b) productivity parameters 
c) efficiency parameters 
d) quality parameters 
e) participation parameters 
 
Following a more detailed description of 
abovementioned parameters: 
 
a) profitability parameters. These are various 
types of parameters which are derived 
from the firm financial statements, manly 
from the Income Statement, for example 
the EBITDA. Usually, the parameters of 
profitability are compared over two 
consecutive years and the bonus is given 
to workers if they improve. 
b) productivity parameters. It is a measure of 
the amount of produced quantities per time 
unit in relation to the amount of work 
resources consumed for obtaining them. 
The bonus is given to the workers if the 
parameters are above a predefined value. 
c) efficiency parameters. It is a measure of 
the quantities produced per time unit in 
relation to the amount of labour resources 
consumed for obtaining them. The 
quantities produced are not measured in 
physical terms as in the case of 
productivity parameters, but through the 
standard time attributed to each product 
obtained. Also in this case the bonus is 
distributed to the workers only if the 
parameter is above a certain threshold. 
d) quality parameters. These parameters are 
aimed at measuring the no-quality 
production (i.e. production that does not 
meet quality standards; for example 
scraps, reworks, waste,) 
e) participation parameters. These 
parameters are designed to measure the 
worker’s willingness to accept individual 
working-time flexibility (for instance 
overtime, daily flexitime, compressed 
working week,). These parameters are 
used for providing a bonus "ad personam", 
normally formulated in the form of a 
correction of the collective bonus based on 
the other parameters. Often these 
participation parameters are included in 
order to discourage absenteeism. 
 
Only the profitability parameters are gathered 
from the company financial statements, the 
others are derived from measurements of 
phenomena physically detectable. In general, 
companies have three options when choosing 
the parameters for a PRP plan: stipulate 
contracts in which wages are related only to 
technical/physical indicators or only to 
economic/business ones or, finally, to a 
combination of the first indicators with the 
second. 
 
In the first case, the so-called gainsharing is 
implemented [21]. With this method, the variable 
component wage is defined by indicators linked 
to the achievement of particular objectives of 
productivity/efficiency or cost reduction, 
established for the factory, the plant, the division, 
or for specific group of workers. In these cases 
the individual worker obtains the advantageous 
outcomes of a communal orientation of the 
specific production unit where s/he is employed. 
Examples of gainsharing plans are Scanlon, 
Rucker, Improshare. 
 
As an alternative to gainsharing, in profitsharing 
the employees see the variable component wage 
calculated on the basis of the financial economic 
results of the company, deduced typically from 
the company profitability indicators. They are 
therefore collective objectives (and indicators), 
distant from the performance of the individual 
employee, which imply the company desire to 
create labour agreements that favour risk 
subdivision. 
 
Whatever choice is made, the utilized 
parameters should be known and comparable, 
easily understandable and translatable with 
simple calculations in payroll, under the effective 
control of the workers and directly influenced by 
their actions and, where it is possible, not 
affected from the factors which are different from 
our measurement. 
 
From this point of view, gainsharing approach 
can have the following main problems: 
 
• First of all, productivity and efficiency are 
necessary but not sufficient conditions for 
economically significant results: The 
factors can be improved but it may not be 
improved the profitability and, therefore, 
the firm ability to pay. For example, despite 
the productivity growing, the net income of 
company may decrease as a result of 
lower prices of products and/or due to 
decrease in quantities sold; 
• Low motivational value because of the 
distance between individual contributions 
and the aggregate result, in a situation in 
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which the problem of the free rider 
becomes more consistent; 
• The risk of rewarding someone who starts 
from low levels of inefficiency, and of 
frustrating others who already operate at 
high levels of efficiency; 
• The risk that additional efficiency 
generates high costs which may not be 
compensated by the benefits (including the 
administrative cost related to the 
programme of incentives). 
 
Two fundamental problems are also found in the 
profitsharing mechanisms: 
 
• Low impact on worker behaviours, when 
the distance between individual 
contributions and the business financial 
performance is substantial; 
• Limited control on the part of shop-floor 
workers: In profit sharing PRP plans, 
employees have difficulty trusting the 
financial data. They have small or no 
control of any measure. Financial results 
may be affected by management choices 
(for example industrial depreciation rates, 
pricing policies, etc.). This is the reason 
why employees prefer operational 
measures, they have more control on 
them. 
 
Based on the considerations made so far, it 
emerges strongly that the choice of indicators 
represents a critical and central issue for a 
company which intends to set up a PRP scheme. 
 
In this paper researchers intend to develop a 
model of analysis that can help companies to 
identify the optimal set of parameters on which 
PRP plan is based. It should be a contingent 
model in the sense that the choice of employable 
parameters is inevitably affected by business 
context. The main hypothesis that this study 
wants to explore is the existence of a correlation 
between some firms' characteristics and the 
parameters on which the bonus calculation is 
based. In particular, we think that (1) ways of 
responding to demand and (2) technological 
profile of manufacturing processes are two 
important variables that influence the choice of 
parameters. 
 
More specifically, this study aims to investigate 
the following research hypothesis: 
 
H(1): There is a relationship between how a 
company responds to market demand 
(i.e. make to stock or make to order or 
engineering to order) and indicators used 
in the PRP plan. 
H(2): There is a relationship between how a 
company measures cost performances 
for bonus calculation in a PRP plan and 
firm's basic characteristics such as 
product and process variety, production 
volume, level of mechanization and 
automation of production. 
H(3): In choosing the parameters on which 
variable pay should be determined, firms 
prefer to use technical/physical 
indicators such as productivity and 
efficiency rather than profitability 
parameters gathered from the company 
financial statements. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows. In section 3 the research methodology 
and the sample characteristics are examined. 
Sections 4 and 5 contain, respectively, the 
descriptive analysis and the interpretative 
analysis of the empirical results. The proposed 
model is depicted in section 6. The last section 
contains the conclusions and managerial 
implications. 
 
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The paper is based upon an empirical research 
field. The research was conducted in Italy at the 
end of 2015. The data were collected by means 
of a questionnaire distributed to companies 
which have implementing for at least ten years, a 
PRP scheme for shop-floor workers. The 
questionnaire was mailed to a sample of 1,285 
companies. The questionnaires sent back were 
287. The data of each 287 companies has been 
suitably encoded in a database in order to easily 
perform the subsequent processing. The relevant 
features of the companies involved are: 
 
• All of them are located in the Northeast of 
Italy, one of highest industrialized 
geographical area in Italy and in Europe 
• They belong to the most representative 
industrial sectors of the area; 
• they are all members of Confindustria 
(General Confederation of Italian Industry) 
which is the lead organization representing 
the manufacturing, construction, energy, 
transportation, ITC, tourism and services 
industries in Italy. 
• They have an active PRP contract at least 
since 2005. 
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A questionnaire was sent to these companies, 
containing 46 questions divided into three 
sections: 
 
• First section: 14 questions about the firm-
market interface: Type of product, product 
variety, production/sale volume, ways to 
respond to market demand (for example 
products are manufactured based on 
demand forecasts or products are 
designed and manufactured based on 
customer specifications,), customer lead 
times. This set of questions was addressed 
to the head of the commercial/sales area. 
• Second section: 17 questions were 
designed in order to collect data about the 
production system: types of manufacturing 
technologies, degree of labour/capital 
intensity; size of production batches; 
relevance of set-up; degree of production 
outsourcing. This set of questions was 
addressed to the head of production or 
plant manager. 
• Third section: 15 questions were designed 
in order to collect data relating to the PRP 
plan: the number and type of indicators 
used, the importance of the variable bonus 
in relation to the whole salary, factors 
which have influenced the adoption of the 
PRP plan; organizational and management 
aspects of PRP scheme. This set of 
questions was addressed to the human 
resources manager. 
 
Fig. 1 outlines main characteristics of the 287 
companies surveyed. 
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Fig. 1. Sample characteristics 
 
5. RESULTS OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: 
A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
 
This section presents a descriptive analysis of 
empirical research results. In the next section, an 
interpretative analysis of these empirical 
evidences will be developed in order to discuss 
the criteria adopted by the sample companies for 
choosing the parameters on which the payment 
of bonus to the workers is based. 
 
The outcome may be summarized as follows: 
 
1) Only 29 companies utilize a single type of 
indicators for the bonus quantification to be 
paid to theirs employees. In particular, 21 
of these companies employ exclusively 
profitability parameters. 
2) Most of the companies prefer to adopt a 
mix of indicators of different nature. The 
combinations empirically identified are the 
following: 
 
• 37 companies: A mix of profitability and 
productivity indicators; 
• 43 companies: a mix of profitability and 
efficiency indicators; 
• 63 companies: a mix of profitability and 
quality indicators; 
• 41 companies: a mix of productivity and 
quality indicators; 
• 45 companies: a mix of efficiency and 
quality indicators; 
• 29 companies: a mix of profitability, 
productivity and quality indicators. 
 
3) All companies utilize participation 
indicators thanks to which an "ad 
personam" bonus is defined. This "ad 
personam" bonus is normally formulated   
in the form of a correction of the     
collective bonus based on the other 
indicators. These parameters are often 
included in order to discourage 
absenteeism. The main participation 
indicators identified are shown in         
Table 1. 
4) Companies (57,14% of the total) utilize at 
least one indicator of profitability for bonus 
calculation. Indicators are drawn from 
officially corporate financial statements, in 
particular from the profit and loss 
statement. The main indicators are listed in 
the Table 2. 
5) 107 companies (37,28% of the total) utilize 
at least one indicator relating to 
productivity performance for bonus 
calculation to be given to workers. The 
productivity is calculated, in general    
terms, as the ratio between the amount of 
output produced and the amount of 
resources consumed, in our case the 
measured productivity is in relation to      
the labour’s performance. The variety        
of productivity indices utilized by              
the companies is represented in         
Table 3. 
6) 92 companies (32,05% of the total) utilized 
at least one indicator of efficiency for 
bonus calculation. The classic formula of 
an efficiency indicator is the ratio of real 
output, measured by the standard times, 
and real input according to the following 
relationship: 
 
∑(Xi*Ti) / Labour hours 
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Where Xi end Ti are, respectively, the     
quantities produced and the standard times 
assigned to each product. The efficiency 
indicators used are shown in Table 4. All the 
indicators refer to the classical definition of 
efficiency. 
 
Table 1. Indicators used by sample companies to measure participation performance 
 
Participation Indicators 
Collective absenteeism (ratio of the number of presence days on the total number of workable days 
in the year for an organizational unit or the entire plant) 
Individual absenteeism (ratio of the number of presence days on the total number of workable days 
in the year for a single worker) 
Willingness to work overtime 
Willingness to accept flexible working times 
% of total hours lost to absenteeism 
 
Table 2. Indicators used by sample companies to measure profitability performance 
 
Profitability indicators 
EBITDA (Earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation, 
amortization) 
Sales Revenue/Number of Employees 
Total gross profit margin EBITDA/Sales Revenues 
Production costs Net Income/Sales Revenue 
Cost of goods sold Total labour cost 
(Wage + Salaries)/Sales Revenue Sales Revenue/Production Cost 
Gross Margin/Sales Revenue Inventory turnover 
Sales per employee hour Gross profit % by department/ team 
Total overtime cost Overtime labour cost ratio 
Labour cost as % of sales  
 
Table 3. Indicators used by sample companies to measure labour productivity performance 
 
Productivity indicators 
Output per period (units)/Number of employees at work 
Units produced per period/Labour hours per period 
Units produced without defects per period/Labour hours per period 
Output per period (units)/Number of employees at work (only direct labour) 
 
Table 4. Indicators used by sample companies to measure labour efficiency performance 
 
Efficiency Indicators 
∑(Xi*Ti) / labour hours 
∑(Xi*Ti) / average number of workers 
∑(Xi + Ri - Si)*Ti / labour hours, in this case Xi represents units without defects, Ri represents units 
that required rework and Sirepresents discarded units 
 
Table 5. Indicators used by sample companies to measure quality performance 
 
Quality Indicators 
Internal quality (No. of defects/ Total no. of goods produced) 
Internal quality (number of errors) 
Internal quality (number of scraps and/or defects) 
Internal quality (total time for rework/total time worked) 
Internal quality (quantity of material wasted) 
External quality (number of complaints from customers) 
External quality (number of customer returns) 
External quality (customer satisfaction index) 
External quality (measure of costs related to warranty) 
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7)  182 companies (63,41% of the total) utilize 
quality indicators for bonus calculation to 
be given to workers. As seen in Table 5, in 
most cases the so-called internal quality is 
measured. Measures may refer to errors, 
defects, scrap, rework, waste, etc. in a 
given period of time. This data can be 
evaluated in absolute terms or compared 
with different parameters (turnover, total 
production, total hours worked, etc.). In 
some few cases (22 equal to 7,66% of the 
total number of companies), the payment 
of bonus is linked to indicators which 
measure the so-called external quality (the 
one that is perceived by customers). Some 
companies measure the customer returns 
or the number of complaints from the 
customers, other the overall customer 
satisfaction or even the costs related to 
warranty period of the product; In all these 
cases, these values are related to a 
predetermined target value. 
 
6. INTERPRETATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
In the previous section we have described the 
indicators that sample companies utilize in order 
to calculate and distribute the bonus in payroll. In 
this section we want to investigate whether there 
is some kind of correlation between the 
indicators utilized by these companies and some 
characteristics of their business and supply chain 
model, such as: 
 
• products typology for market response 
strategy; 
• manufacturing organization and production 
planning methodology; 
• complexity of the logistics system in terms 
of manufactured products variety, process 
variety and make or buy strategies. 
 
The development of this interpretative model 
could be a useful reference tool for all those 
companies that intend to develop a corporate 
agreement in line with the logic of the PRP. In 
order to develop the model it is necessary to 
identify, in the first place, the competitive 
priorities (also called critical success factors, 
performance objectives or competitive variables) 
that theoretically could be used in a PRP 
scheme. 
 
Slack et al. [22] point out that competition 
between companies is realized through five basic 
competitive priorities: 
• Quality - defined as compliance with the 
specifications ("internal quality") and as 
product/service design quality ("external 
quality"); 
• Speed - quick response to customer 
requests; 
• Dependability - the ability to maintain the 
"promises" to the customer in terms of 
delivery date; 
• Flexibility - product flexibility (ability to 
introduce new products), volume flexibility 
(ability of the operation to change its level 
of output), mix flexibility (ability to provide a 
wide range or mix of products) and delivery 
flexibility (ability to change the timing of the 
delivery); 
• Cost. 
 
Among these competitive variables, which are 
coherent with the purpose of a performance-pay 
system? Which performance makes more explicit 
the direct link between bonus and shop-floor 
workers behaviour? As mentioned above, the 
effectiveness of a performance-related pay is 
linked to its ability to encourage improvements in 
labour performance; This ability is strongly 
dependent on the choice of performance 
indicators. Indicators taken as reference for the 
remuneration variability should be able to directly 
influenced by worker; the more unclear is the 
relationship between worker commitment and 
contribution and performance indicators, the less 
effective is the expected result regarding to 
behaviours due to monetary incentive. In this 
perspective it is important to analyse the five 
competitive performances proposed by Slack et 
al. [22]. 
 
First of all we examine the "external quality" 
performance, which concern the design 
adequacy of the product/service towards the 
target-customer needs. Since workers do not 
have any possibility to influence the relationship 
between products offered by the company and 
customer needs and expectations, this 
performance type cannot be utilized for the 
provision of a bonus for the shop-floor workers. 
In fact, the results of the empirical survey confirm 
this statement, considering the limited number of 
companies using indicators related to external 
quality perceived by the customer. 
 
As regards the "internal quality", this usually 
refers to the amount of: 
 
• Errors 
• Defects 
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• Time for rework 
• Material waste 
 
All these entities are not quality performance but 
rather cost performance, in the sense that they 
essentially represent efficiency measures. In 
other words, these measures of the internal 
quality may be utilized as a correction factor in 
the determination of cost performance. For this 
reason, please refer to the following 
considerations on production costs. 
 
Speed performance - quick response to 
customer requests - is connected to the physical 
characteristics of production system and also to 
the operating criteria adopted to manage the 
various manufacturing activities. This is 
especially true for those production systems 
where speed is determined by a complex set of 
commercial choices (e.g. orders anticipation or 
postponement) and production planning strategy; 
consequently the shop-floor workers may barely 
affect the indicators linked to that category of 
performance and, in any case, their real 
contribution is difficult to measure. In the case of 
“engineered to order” products (manufactured in 
small or very small volumes), the rapidity to 
respond to customer could present a greater 
correlation with the factory workers performance. 
Since the very low standardization of operations 
and the significant level of discretion that 
distinguishes operational tasks in this production 
context, the time for the physical realization of 
the product is a performance that is directly 
controlled by the worker. 
 
Actually no company in the sample has based 
the calculation of bonus using speed as a 
performance indicator; This fact suggests 
avoiding the application of speed-based 
indicators. What emerges from the empirical 
analysis is that companies prefer to measure the 
willingness of workers to guarantee working 
hours flexibility in relation to the company 
production needs; flexible working hours and a 
willingness to work overtime may be important 
"parameters of participation" on which to base 
the formula of a PRP scheme. 
 
The same considerations can be developed 
regarding dependability. Only for "engineered to 
order” companies it may be possible to support 
and validate a bonus for the workers related to 
dependability: in these contexts it may be 
assumed that on-time delivery of each order can 
be linked to the performances of a defined 
workers group. However, no company of the 
sample utilizes dependability as a base for the 
calculation of bonus to be given to employees; 
this evidence suggests avoiding the application 
of such indicators to assess the bonuses 
payment. As seen before, companies prefer to 
measure the workers' willingness to provide 
flexibility of working hours as an important factor 
to maintain the "promises" to the customer in 
terms of delivery date. 
 
As regards flexibility performances, especially 
product flexibility and mix flexibility, they are also 
closely linked to the structural characteristics of 
the production system. Therefore, they are 
inadequate for the purpose of PRP; Contribution 
of the shop-floor workers in the progress of these 
performances is difficult to identify and quantify. 
In fact, no company in the sample utilizes such 
indicators. Instead, volume flexibility and delivery 
flexibility could be related to the workers' 
willingness to ensure flexibility of working hours. 
In this perspective it is interesting to note that all 
companies in the sample utilizes "parameters of 
participation" in order to define the formula for 
calculating the bonus. 
 
Lastly, the cost performance usually refers both 
to the direct costs and to the indirect production 
costs, as follows: 
 
Total cost = direct cost + indirect production 
costs 
 
Direct cost is the sum of the costs of materials 
and costs of manufacturing processes (direct 
labour). Indirect production cost refers to 
activities such as production planning, logistics 
management, quality control, and suppliers 
relations management and so on. 
 
First of all, we consider the case of those 
companies in which the amount of the direct 
costs represents only a small part of the cost 
performance. In this case the total cost is 
approximated to the indirect costs: 
 
Total cost ≈ indirect production costs 
 
When total cost is significant due to the costs of 
indirect activities, the only way for measuring 
total cost performance is to use data derived 
from the company financial statements            
(i.e. profitability parameters). The analysis of the 
sample confirms the presence of a strong 
correlation between the use of profitability ratios 
and high level of complexity of the manufacturing 
and logistic system. 
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Now, we consider the case where direct costs 
are the largest portion of the total cost: 
 
Total cost ≈ direct production costs 
 
The analysis of the empirical results shows that 
direct costs has been calculated in two different 
ways: 
 
• By measuring productivity and/or 
efficiency. This way is feasible if there is 
the guarantee that the measure of 
productivity/efficiency is in inverse 
relationship with the direct production costs 
(limited to the labour component of this 
cost). Firms which determine direct costs 
through productivity/efficiency parameters 
are characterized by a production volume 
of homogeneous products that can be 
measured by counting the units produced 
in physical terms or in terms of standard 
times; 
• By measuring profitability: when products 
that are manufactured are very 
heterogeneous, it will not be possible to 
use measures of productivity/efficiency.  
 
To summarize the findings from the empirical 
analysis: 
 
1) In all companies which use 
special/dedicated technologies for 
manufacturing a small range of products in 
high volumes, the measure of cost 
performance is always performed by the 
productivity measures; 
2) In all companies that utilize much more 
flexible/universal technologies, suitable for 
manufacturing a large range of products in 
small volumes and based on customer 
specifications, the cost performance is 
always measured by profitability indicators. 
In other words, the output of the production 
system, as well as the resources needed 
as input, can be appraise only through the 
comparison between revenues (total or 
partial) and costs (full or partial) that 
enables these revenues; 
3) Much more complex is the analysis of 
those companies which are between the 
two extremes mentioned above. In some 
cases they are closer to those companies 
that make products in high volume and low 
variety using mostly special/dedicated 
technologies. In other cases, they are 
closer to those companies that make 
products in low volume and high variety 
using mostly flexible/universal 
technologies. In any case, these are 
companies that manufacture products 
whose physical characteristics and 
production processes are "a priori" well-
known (i.e. not defined from customer 
specifications). This means that in many 
cases it is available a database of standard 
times. In industrial engineering, the 
standard times are the times required by 
an average skilled operator, working at a 
normal pace, to perform a specified task 
using a prescribed method. They include 
appropriate allowances in order to enables 
the workers to recover from fatigue and, 
where necessary, an additional allowance 
to cover contingent elements which may 
occur without having been observed. 
 
When in the production processes are preferably 
used special/dedicated technologies, if there is a 
standard time database, it is possible to calculate 
the direct costs of product through efficiency 
measures. Without this database, the companies 
in this category show a clear use of productivity 
parameters in order to measure the direct 
production costs performance. The use of special 
and dedicated machines is consistent with an 
output characterized by medium-low variety and 
medium-high production volumes; therefore it is 
sufficiently homogenous and measurable by 
productivity indicators. 
 
When in the production processes are preferably 
used universal/flexible technologies, if there is a 
standard time database it is still possible to 
calculate direct production cost through 
measures of efficiency. Without this database, 
companies show a clear application of 
profitability parameters. The use of flexible and 
universal machines is coherent with an output 
characterized by a medium-high variety and low-
medium production volume. It is a non-
homogeneous output that involves the use of 
profitability indicators. 
 
These considerations are summarized in Fig. 2. 
 
7. THE PROPOSED MODEL 
 
The results of the analysis described in the 
previous section have identified a set of 
relationships between some company 
characteristics and the use of specific indicators 
for measuring the bonus to be given to the shop 
floor workers. 
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In this section, building upon the results 
obtained, we would like to formulate a model 
able to interpret the behaviour of companies 
when selecting the parameters or indicators on 
which base the PRP plan. As it will be explained 
shortly, the models correlate three different 
typologies of companies with different types of 
indicators which have to be used for bonus 
calculation. Our expectation is that such model 
can help those firms that intend to implement a 
PRP plan. After having recognized to which 
category a firm belongs, it can easily identify the 
types of indicators to be used. 
 
As previously mentioned, the model development 
requires singling out different reference groups of 
firms. In order to identify these reference groups 
we have to choose some company 
characteristics that are significantly positively 
associated with different types of indicators. 
These characteristics refer on one hand to the 
firm-market interface, on the other hand to the 
production system profile. In the first case the 
focus is on elements such as product type, 
product variety, way to respond to market 
demand, customer lead times. In the second 
case, the following elements are taken into 
consideration: type of technology used in 
manufacturing processes, degree of production 
repetitiveness, production volume, level of 
product and process standardization. 
 
These variables are the basis of numerous 
classification frameworks of production systems 
proposed in the literature. In particular, using the 
typology of customer order decoupling point 
proposed by Wortmann [23] and the product-
process matrix of Hayes and Wheelwright [24], 
manufacturing firms can be divided into three 
reference groups: 
 
• MTS (Make to stock) production systems; 
• TO (To order) production systems that 
encompasses classic typologies as ATO 
(Assemble To Order), MTO (Make to 
Order) and PTO (Purchasing To Order) 
• ETO (Engineer to order) production 
systems. 
 
The MTS mode consists of the fabrication of 
large quantities of products in low variety. 
Companies have a catalogue (products are 
designed ex-ante, i.e. before they are offered to 
the customers) and the production is 
programmed according to demand forecasts. 
The low number of product variants combined 
with a linearization of production flows allows to 
utilize dedicated resources, very specialized and 
with very short lead time for responding to the 
orders. 
 
Conversely, in ETO companies the processes of 
design, engineering, industrialization and 
production are activated ex-post (i.e. after 
receiving product specifications from customers). 
Product variety is very high, production volumes 
are small, production flows are irregular and 
variability of the routings is very high. 
Manufacturing these products requires high 
flexibility of production system, which is obtained 
by the use of generic and multipurpose-use 
equipment. The customer lead-time is generally 
very long. 
 
To-Order term identifies a large mix of 
companies that are very different from each other 
and are located between the two previous 
groups. In this category, we find companies that 
produce and sell products which have bill of 
materials and routings almost completely 
defined. Sometimes, these products are 
manufactured in a wide differentiated range of 
models, obtained through the assembly of a 
relatively limited number of standardized 
components and subassemblies. In other cases, 
products are adapted to customer’s requests 
through a limited design effort starting from a 
basic model. Depending on the production 
volume, To-Order companies utilize machines 
and manufacturing technologies which can be 
more dedicated and specialized or more flexible 
and universal. 
 
The considerations made so far are summarized 
in Table 6. 
 
Since we have defined these three classes of 
firms, we can now start to build the interpretation 
model. The model aims to specify, for each of 
these classes, the indicators to be used for the 
calculation and payment of the variable pay 
bonus. 
 
Table 7 summarizes the empirical results 
regarding to the first four competitive 
performances previously seen: quality (external 
and internal), speed, dependability and    
flexibility. 
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Fig. 2. Profitability, productivity and efficiency indicators for measuring cost performance 
 
Table 6. Main characteristics of the three different groups of firms 
 
 
Make to stock 
production systems 
To order 
production systems 
Engineering to order 
production systems 
Product Variety Low Medium High 
Production volume High Medium Low or one of a kind 
Catalogue Yes Yes No 
Product design 
and development 
Products are designed 
ex-ante, i.e. before they 
are offered to the 
customers 
Mixed way Products are designed ex-
post, i.e. after receiving 
product specifications from 
customers 
Lead Time Short Medium Long 
Types of machines Specialized, dedicated 
machines 
Specialized or flexible 
machines 
Flexible machines 
 
The examination of the Table 7 allows us to 
formulate the following considerations: 
 
• These four competitive priorities are never 
subject to direct measurement, they should 
not be used for the calculation and payment 
of the bonus to the workers; 
• Measures of internal quality performance 
must be taken into account in a PRP plan 
but with the goal of correcting the measure 
of cost performance; 
• Workers' willingness to adapt to flexible 
working time, to ensure, in other words, a 
high level of participation to the company's 
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production needs is of paramount 
importance. This is the key parameter that 
must be always considered for the bonus 
calculation and distribution. The direct 
measurement of this parameter indirectly 
determines the company’s capability to be 
competitive in terms of time (speed and 
dependability) and of flexibility. 
 
We try now to shed light on the companies’ 
behaviour with regard to cost performance. Table 
8 shows, for the three classes of companies, the 
typologies of indicators to use in order to 
measure cost performance and to calculate and 
distribute the bonus to workers. As seen, the 
overall cost is the sum of the direct costs and 
indirect costs. The examination of the Table 8 
allows us to formulate the following observations: 
 
• with regard to the indirect costs, companies 
have to utilize profitability parameters (i.e. 
parameters derived from the company 
financial statements), regardless of the 
group to which they belong; 
• companies must adopt different parameters 
for measuring the direct cost; 
 
- MTS companies should use productivity 
parameters. When product variety is low 
and routings are well defined and stable, 
productivity measures are the most 
appropriate; 
- ETO companies should use profitability 
parameters in order to measure direct 
production costs. When product variety 
is high and work cycles are not 
standardized, productivity and also 
efficiency indicators are not suitable to 
determine direct cost performance. The 
great variability of products and 
production processes imposes the use of 
profitability parameters; 
- To-Order companies should generally 
use efficiency indicators for measuring 
direct cost performance. As product are 
available from a catalogue, the structure 
of their bill of material is fairly well 
defined and work cycles are almost 
stable, if standard time data are 
available, To-Order firms can measure 
quantities produced and consequently 
direct production costs. However, due to 
the great variability of situations found    
in this group of firms, other combinations 
are possible. When standard time       
data are not available, product variety is 
low and production takes place       
mainly with special machines, 
productivity parameters should be       
used for measuring direct                    
cost performance. This fact is justified   
by the relative high standardization of    
the output. Conversely, in the absence   
of standard time data, if product variety 
is relative high and manufacturing   
makes mainly use of flexible,       
universal machines, companies should 
use profitability parameters. The reason 
for this is due to the variability of the 
output. 
 
Table 7. How to measures Quality, Time and Flexibility performances for bonus calculation in a 
PRP plan 
 
  
Make to Stock           To Order            Engineering To Order 
Quality Performance 
(External Measures) 
Not measured 
Quality 
Performance(Internal 
Measures) 
Measures of internal quality performance (scraps, defects, rework,...) 
must be taken into account in a PRP plan but with the goal of 
correcting the measure of cost performance 
Time Performance (Speed) Not directly measured, firms must evaluate workers' willingness to 
accept individual working-time flexibility 
Time Performance 
(Dependability) 
Not directly measured, firms must evaluate workers' willingness to 
accept individual working-time flexibility 
Product flexibility 
Performance 
Not measured 
Mix flexibility Performance Not measured 
Volume flexibility 
Performance 
Not directly measured, firms must evaluate workers' willingness to 
accept individual working-time flexibility 
Delivery flexibility 
Performance 
Not directly measured, firms must evaluate workers' willingness to 
accept individual working-time flexibility 
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Table 8. How to measures cost performances for bonus calculation in a PRP plan 
 
  
  
Indirect 
costs 
Direct costs 
Specialized, dedicated machines Flexible, universal machines 
 
MTS 
M
e
a
su
re
s 
o
f 
Pr
o
fit
ab
ili
ty
 
Measures of Productivity 
 
 
TO 
Measures of Efficiency (when 
standard time are not available 
measures of Productivity) 
Measures of Efficiency (when 
standard time are not available 
measures of Profitability) 
 
ETO 
 
Measures of Profitability 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS AND MANAGERIAL 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
In the last decades, within the wider Human 
Resource Management debate, a central role 
has been played by the analysis of those 
changes in compensation systems driven by the 
use of new methodologies and technologies and 
the related changes in the organisation of 
production and work. If improving 
competitiveness is not achievable without 
significant contribution of the workers, one 
possible way to ensure this contribution is to 
define an additional and variable remuneration. 
For firms which have the intention to set up a 
performance-related pay (PRP) plan, a very 
important aspect is the identification of 
parameters to base the calculation of the bonus 
to distribute to the shop-floor workers. 
 
Our aim was to develop a model of analysis that 
can help companies to identify the optimal set of 
parameters on which basing the PRP plan. This 
paper has focused on the relationship between 
some characteristics of the company production 
system and the types of parameters to be 
measured. 
 
First of all, based on the work of Slack et al.[16] 
we have identified five basic competitive 
priorities: quality (defined as internal and external 
quality), speed (quick response to customer 
requests), dependability (the ability to maintain 
the "promises" to the customer in terms of 
delivery date), flexibility (in terms of product 
flexibility, volume flexibility, mix flexibility and 
delivery flexibility) and cost. 
 
Secondly, companies have been divided into 
three classes: MTS (Make To Stock), To-Order 
and ETO (engineering To Order).  
 
• For each of these three groups, the 
proposed model (see Table 7 and Table 8) 
suggests the appropriate indicators to pick 
for the PRP plan. The managerial 
implications that emerge can be 
summarized as follows: 
• do not use parameters related to time 
performance (both speed and 
dependability), external quality and 
flexibility (in its various types). The reason 
lies in the inability to determine a link 
between these performance improvements 
and the real benefits that could be shared 
with workers; 
• it is important to define appropriate 
indicators in order to measure the 
willingness of workers to guarantee 
working time flexibility in relation to the 
company production needs. This measure 
allows the definition of bonus at the 
individual level; 
• cost performance measurements are the 
key indicators to base the calculation of the 
bonus for workers. The cost performance 
must always be rectified by measuring the 
number of errors/scraps/defects/      
wastes generated by the production 
processes; 
• in many cases, companies cannot refer to 
physical parameters and they have to use 
profitability ones derived from the financial 
statements. In these cases, firms must be 
aware of the problems that could arise due 
in particular to the low impact of these 
indicators on individual behaviour and to 
the limited possibilities of control by 
workers. If the use of profitability 
parameters is obligatory, it is important to 
choose parameters derived from only the 
Income Statement and related to 
manufacturing operations such as 
EBITDA, without taking into account those 
elements beyond the control of workers 
(such as depreciation charges); 
• if cost performance significantly depends 
on the indirect production costs, cost 
  
 
 
Panizzolo et al.; AIR, 10(5): 1-19, 2017; Article no.AIR.34518 
 
 
 
16 
 
improvements must be measured with 
profitability parameters. 
• if cost performance predominantly 
depends on direct production costs, cost 
improvements should be measured with 
physical parameters (productivity and 
efficiency), because they have a clear 
correlation with the generation of an 
incremental profit thanks to the 
performance improvement resulting from 
the contribution of the workers. However, 
the use of these parameters of efficiency 
and productivity is only possible when the 
manufactured products are sufficiently 
homogeneous and the firm has standard 
time data; 
• if product variety is high and production 
volume is low and if the firm has not 
standard time data, it is necessary to use 
profitability parameters. In this situation, it 
becomes difficult for companies to have 
significant measures of the total amount 
produced per time unit and, then, to utilize 
indices based on physical parameters.  
 
The future scope of this research is to test the 
interpretative framework developed in a wider 
group of companies in order to assess both its 
limits and potential and also to highlight possible 
improvements. In this perspective, researchers 
have come in touch with Confindustria. Founded 
in 1910 Confindustria is the Italy's main 
employers' confederation. It brings together 
150.447 voluntary member companies of all 
sizes, amounting to 5.440.125 employees. 
Confindustria provides several services to his 
members through regional offices. In particular it 
helps employers in setting up the PRP plan and 
to negotiate it with the trade unions. Starting from 
mid-2016 some Confindustria's regional offices 
situated in the North of Italy are using the 
framework as a platform for building trade union 
agreements for their affiliated companies. Using 
the framework in hundreds if not thousands of 
business cases will allow the researchers to 
gather important feedback for a model revision 
aimed at make it more strong. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Example of questions to be found in the questionnaire 
 
Describe the products made at this plant: 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
How many levels of management are there in the plant, from first level supervisor on up to plant 
manager?  (Example: supervisor, superintendent, plant manager=3 levels). ___________ 
 
How many products are manufactured at this plant?    ___________ 
 
What per cent of the production volume is manufactured in the following ways? 
 
Manufacturing cells  _____%   Dedicated flow line(s)  _____% 
Mixed model line(s)  _____%   Other ways   _____% 
 
Describe the degree to which this firm is vertically integrated (owns elements of the total chain, from 
transforming a raw material to putting it in the hands of the consumers): 
 
Not at all  ______   Low   ______ 
Medium   ______   High    ______ 
 
How many customers does this plant serve (approximately)?   ______ 
 
How many orders does this plant process each month, on average?  ______ 
 
The production process in this plant is best characterized as follows: 
 
One of a kind   _____%  Small  batch   _____% 
Large batch  _____%  Repetitive/line flow  _____% 
Continuous   _____% 
 
Overall, how extensively are products customized in your plant? 
 
Highly customized   _____% Somewhat customized  _____% 
Standard, with custom options  _____% Somewhat standardized _____% 
Highly standardized   _____% 
 
What per cent of the equipment and processes that you currently use in manufacturing falls into each 
of the following categories? 
 
Standard equipment purchased from vendors   _____% 
Vendor equipment which was modified for our use   _____% 
Proprietary equipment designed by our company  _____% 
Proprietary equipment designed and built by our company  _____% 
 
For each union within your plant, list the year that it was certified as the representative for it’s 
bargaining unit, along with the name of the union. 
 
Union name_____________________________________________ Year Certified__________ 
 
Union name_____________________________________________ Year Certified__________ 
 
Union name_____________________________________________ Year Certified__________ 
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The manufacturing cost structure: please give the breakdown for your most recently completed 
budget year. 
 
Bought-out raw materials      ___% 
Purchased components, assemblies and packaging    ___% 
Energy cost        ___% 
Bought-out services (rent, rates, equipment hire, etc.)    ___% 
Direct labour        ___% 
Indirect factory labour      ___% 
All other labour (including staff & managerial)     ___% 
Depreciation charges       ___% 
Other         ___% 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
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